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
A Study of
North Korean and Chinese
Soldiers' Attitudes Toward
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ORO abstract

A STUDY OF NORTH KOREAN AND CHINESE SOLDIERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD THE KOREAN WAR

by

Lessing A. Kahn
Joanne E. Jackson
Theodore R. Vallance
Florence K. Nierman
Julius Segal

abstract taken by _____

Knowledge of the ideological weaknesses of an enemy target audience, and of the more vulnerable segments of that audience will permit the tailoring for specific purposes of propaganda themes most likely to exploit fully such vulnerabilities. Information and Education purposes also are served by such knowledge, which makes it possible to select those among the prisoners who would be most amenable to indoctrination, and those themes to which the POWs are known to be most receptive. This study was designed to investigate certain aspects of the North Korean and Chinese soldier attitudes toward the Korean War.

Psywar should be differentially designed for the various target audiences, and should exploit the weaknesses of the audience to which it is to be disseminated; for psywar designed to affect attitudes of the type studied here, North Korean enlisted men should receive the highest priority, Chinese enlisted men, Chinese officers, and North Korean officers following in that order.

Information and Education programs should utilize the questionnaire scales to group POWs homogeneously, and as an index of program effectiveness.

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6410 Connecticut Avenue
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Technical Memorandum ORO-T-34(FEC)



A Study of North Korean and Chinese Soldiers' Attitudes Toward the Korean War

by

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NOTE

ORO's primary purpose in this study, as in other studies of enemy attitudes, is to increase the effectiveness of psychological warfare operations by pointing out those targets and themes which promise the best "return" for the effort expended. In this connection, both this study and ORO-T-40 (FEC)* evaluate the target groups studied in the order of their expected "payoff." This order is not the same in the two studies, and each may differ still from those to be recommended in forthcoming reports dealing with enemy attitudes. These differences are due to the following reason:

Although the enemy groups tested remain essentially the same, each study considers a different set of attitudes. This report considers aspects of enemy morale with respect to attitudes toward the Korean War. Therefore, if the operator wishes to lower enemy morale by changing or reinforcing attitudes toward the Korean War of the type studied here, the target priorities established in this study apply and should be utilized. ORO-T-40 (FEC), on the other hand, is concerned with a number of attitudes which, in varying degrees, predispose the enemy to surrender. If, then, the purpose of the operator is to induce as many enemy soldiers as possible to surrender by affecting those attitudes shown to be important in surrender, he should utilize the target priorities established in ORO-T-40 (FEC).

In sum, these studies have in common the attempt to find the best customer and the best sales talk. That they are not the same in each study is due only to the fact that each envisages the sale of a different commodity.

*Operations Research Office, "Psychological Warfare and Other Factors Affecting the Surrender of NK and CF Forces," Feb 53. CONFIDENTIAL

PREFACE

This study on the attitudes of North Korean and Chinese soldiers is based on data approximately two years old. It obviously has no direct relation to the current situation; therefore it seems appropriate to give some explanation concerning the value of its publication at this time.

When the Korean war started, it became apparent that modern techniques of psychological measurement could be applied to a degree beyond that which was accomplished during World War II, both to analysis of the audience to whom psychological warfare messages are addressed and to the measurement of the effects gained by our psychological warfare measures. At the same time, however, it was also clear that the development of simple and reliable techniques for this purpose would itself be a far more extended task than the general application of known techniques as such.

The technical measurement of audience characteristics and of psywar effects, as attempted by the Operations Research Office, has been, in a fundamental sense, experimental. Questionnaire information was collected on such a scale that it has required a considerable time and effort to explore all the possibilities of analysis and correlation. At the same time, it will probably be agreed that only such exhaustive work to exploit the methods applied could eventually lead to identification of the reliable and simple elements in the techniques which might in the future be applied with far less cost and far quicker results. Our objective is by no means to furnish the Army with stale news concerning the attitudes of enemy personnel long since either dead, captured, or rotated in the enemy forces. The fundamental objective is rather to reach a stage in the application of such techniques where quick, simple, and valid instruments can be designed, which will have immediate operational usefulness to the ground forces in combat.

This is not to say that the results here presented have no value whatever for current application. The exact ratios shown

are, of course, obsolete. This does not mean that they have been reversed.

The study therefore is issued for the value it may have in more than one connection. On the one hand it is felt that it has some value directly as an indicator of enemy attitudes, and on the other hand it represents another step in the accumulation of enough experience with the types of techniques it uses to approach the point where more effective instruments can be devised.

George S. Pettee
29 July 1953

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SUMMARY

PROBLEM

The problem was to determine the attitudes of Chinese and North Korean soldiers toward the Korean war, and the facets of those attitudes and the segments of the audience which could most effectively be exploited.

FACTS.

This study represents one of a series of ORO research efforts designed to develop and apply psychological instruments in assessing vulnerabilities of enemy target audiences.

The data for the present study were gathered by means of questionnaires in August and September, 1951; a sample of 3042 POWs was interviewed, of which 1124 were Chinese and 1918 were North Koreans.

DISCUSSION

An interview schedule was constructed containing 65 items as administered to the Chinese respondents, and 62 items as used with the North Koreans. The questionnaire probed the POWs' attitudes toward the course of the war, toward the consequences of the war, toward the enemy, and toward the postponement of social improvements in order to further the war effort. In addition, the questionnaire explored the attitudes of the POWs toward the credibility of their news sources and their confidence in the military capability of the Chinese and North Korean forces.

CONCLUSIONS

1. North Korean officers were optimistic about the course and consequences of the war, whereas the enlisted men were essentially indifferent or pessimistic.
2. News sources were considered reliable by a majority of the North Korean officers, but were distrusted by a large number of the enlisted men.
3. The North Korean officers were confident of the military capability of the Chinese and the North Korean forces, whereas the NK enlisted men were characterized by lack of confidence or indecision.
4. Approximately half of both the Chinese officer and enlisted man groups were optimistic about the course of the war; more than a third of each group was indifferent.
5. With regard to the consequences of the war, the Chinese enlisted men were optimistic; the officers were markedly so.
6. The Chinese officers held attitudes quite unfavorable to the enemy; the enlisted men were largely indifferent or held unfavorable attitudes.
7. For the North Korean group as a whole, longer time in the army, training, and education tended to be associated with greater optimism in regard to the war and its consequences, and greater confidence in news sources and the military capability of the NK and CCF forces.
8. The attitudes of the North Korean officers and enlisted men, considered separately, did not vary significantly in relation to the background characteristics enumerated in 7 above; however, among the North Korean enlisted men, greater optimism in regard to the war and its consequences and greater confidence in their news sources and the military capability of the North Korean and CCF forces were associated with longer training.
9. For the Chinese sample as a whole, greater optimism about the consequences of the war, and more unfavorable attitudes toward the enemy were associated with longer training; in addition, former students tended to be more unfavorable toward the enemy and more willing to postpone social improvements than farmers.
10. The attitudes of the Chinese officers varied in relation to length of training, former occupation, and political party membership.
 - a. Former students tended to be more unfavorable to the enemy and more willing to postpone social improvements than the farmers.

b. Although both Kuomintang and Communist members were optimistic in regard to the consequences of the war, Kuomintang members were somewhat more so.

c. Those officers having more than 12 months training were more optimistic about the consequences of the war and more favorable to the postponement of social improvements than those having seven to nine months training.

11. The attitudes of the Chinese enlisted men varied in relation to political party membership: New Democratic Youth League members were more optimistic in regard to the war and its consequences than were Communist members.

12. North Korean capturees tended to display greater optimism in regard to the war and its consequences and greater confidence in their new sources and the military capability of the NK and CCF forces than North Korean surrenderers.

13. In general, the attitudes of the Chinese capturees did not differ significantly from those of the Chinese surrenderers.

RECOMMENDATIONS*

1. Psywar designed to affect attitudes of the type studied here should be differentially disseminated with respect to varying target priorities; that is, the North Korean enlisted men should receive the highest priority: the Chinese enlisted men, Chinese officers, and North Korean officers should follow in order.

2. Psywar should be differentially designed for the various target audiences.

a. Psywar should exploit the indifference or pessimism of the North Korean enlisted men in regard to the course and consequences of the war and should also exploit their lack of confidence in their news sources and in the capability of their forces.

b. Psywar should exploit the indifference of a large segment of the Chinese enlisted men to the course and consequences of the war.

c. Psywar should exploit the indifference to the course of the war on the part of a large number of Chinese officers.

3. In conjunction with Information and Education programs, the questionnaire scales should be utilized to group POWs homo-

*It is recognized that implementation of some of the recommendations may have occurred since the time of data collection, and that the applicability of some of the recommendations is a function of the extent to which attitudes of this sample are typical of attitudes currently held by the enemy.

geneously first, as to receptivity to indoctrination, that is, level of optimism about the war and its consequences, etc., and second, in respect to the content areas to which POWs would be most vulnerable; and before and after indoctrination programs to secure an index of program effectiveness.

4. A continuing assessment of enemy attitudes, utilizing the questionnaire scales, should be made in order to implement basic recommendations 1 and 2 in future use.

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A STUDY OF NORTH KOREAN AND CHINESE
SOLDIERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD THE KOREAN WAR

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INTRODUCTION

The present study of North Korean and Chinese soldier attitudes toward the Korean war was designed to investigate certain aspects of the attitudinal structure of enemy target audiences in order to reveal ideological weaknesses of each audience and determine those segments of each audience which were most vulnerable to propaganda. This assessment can thus serve both psychological warfare and information and education purposes.

In psywar operations, a knowledge of the more vulnerable segments of the target audience allows propaganda to be directed to those groups against whom it will be maximally effective. A knowledge of enemy ideological weaknesses reveals those propaganda themes most likely to exploit fully such weaknesses, thus allowing future propaganda materials to be tailored for specific purposes, and permitting those propaganda materials already available to be used more effectively.

Parallel purposes are served in respect to Information and Education operations. Those prisoners most amenable to indoctrination can be selected, and the effectiveness of indoctrination programs enhanced, by a purposive use of themes to which the audience is known to be most receptive. The periodic reassessment of attitudes suggests a feasible method of indoctrination evaluation.

The elements of attitudinal structure that this study investigated were aspects of a complex of attitudes toward the Korean war. The problem of determining vulnerable portions of the target audience was approached through a study of the relationship of background characteristics of the sample to these attitudes. Content area vulnerabilities were sought in examination of differences in attitudes in regard to the various components of the complex.

SOURCES OF THE DATA

THE SAMPLE

During August and September 1951, 3042 POWs were interviewed; 1124 were Chinese and 1918 were North Koreans. The large size of these samples compares favorably with the samples generally used in present-day social survey research. It is impossible, however, to make a detailed comparison between the samples of this study and the populations from which they were drawn, since data describing the prisoner and army populations are not available.

Considering the limiting conditions of field investigation, the samples were selected as systematically as possible. In order to avoid biases which would tend to distort the composition of the samples, certain precautions were taken.

1. As large a number of prison camps as practicable were utilized, thus eliminating biases occasioned by the treatment, organization, or other situational factors unique to the prisoners of any particular camp. The camps from which the samples were drawn included those in the Pusan area and those on Koje Do.

2. Only North Korean and Chinese Communist soldiers were interviewed; all refugees and political prisoners were excluded, in order that the samples might be composed exclusively of enemy military forces.

3. Any prisoners receiving special treatment which might color their attitudes were excluded from the sample:

- a. the hospitalized or physically handicapped,
- b. those in punitive confinement or protective custody, and
- c. those who had been subjected to the influences of the US Army Information and Education program.

Thus, the large size of the samples and the elimination of the biases noted from their composition provide a reasonable basis for the careful extrapolation of the findings of this investigation to the parent populations from which the samples were derived.*

*Pertinent background characteristics descriptive of the sample are presented in Appendix F.

INTERVIEWERS

The field team of interviewers was composed of nineteen native Koreans and Chinese working under American supervision. They were well qualified for interview work on the bases of education, administrative ability, and occupational background. With few exceptions, they spoke Chinese, Korean, and Japanese fluently, and were familiar with variations of dialects. They also had a good working knowledge of English.

This total field team was divided into six tent-teams of three interviewers each, with one member of each tent-team serving as leader of his group. One additional interviewer served as supervisor of all six tent-teams.

During a training period of approximately ten days, the interviewers became thoroughly familiar with all of the materials and procedures of the study.

PROCEDURE

Careful measures to secure meaningful responses were necessitated by the language barrier, the low rate of literacy, and the lack of sophistication of the Oriental POWs in regard to questionnaire administration.

The prisoners were divided into groups of 40 to 60, and each such group was accommodated in a large tent.

Each tent-team leader read aloud the general instructions.* It was emphasized that there were no "right" or "wrong" answers, and the POWs were urged to give their own opinions by checking the response closest to their own feelings. They were assured of the anonymity of their responses, and that no discriminatory treatment would ensue as a result of their participation. A thorough explanation was made of the use of the five-answer-category question employed in the questionnaire. This explanation was facilitated by the use of a large board which illustrated this type question, and the careful exposition of an example. The board was displayed throughout the testing, and, as a reminder, the five-answer categories were reread at the beginning of each new page of the questionnaire. Each question and the series of answers was read aloud by the tent leader. The other tent-team members acted as proctors throughout the testing procedures.

*The complete instructions appear in Appendix G.

Of the total interviewing time of approximately 90 minutes, about an hour was spent in the preliminary instruction period and in securing the background data, and only a half hour in the administration of the Military Optimism Questionnaire.*

At the completion of the questionnaire administration, the prisoners' comments were invited. In general, they indicated a high degree of interest and little boredom or fatigue. Members of the field team concurred that the prisoners seemed highly motivated and quite serious throughout the testing session.

QUESTIONNAIRE

The Military Optimism Questionnaire consisted of 65 items administered to the Chinese POWs, and 62 to the North Koreans.* The consistency of the scales, i.e., the degree to which repeated administration of the questionnaire would yield the same results, was determined by statistical analysis. In addition, the scales were analyzed to determine the extent to which each measured a single factor.* As a result of these analyses, six scales were retained, two of which were common to the NK and CCF versions, so that approximately 65 percent of the content of the two questionnaires was identical.

The items of the Military Optimism Scale (OAB),[†] a scale appearing in both the Chinese and North Korean questionnaires, dealt generally with optimism in regard to the course of the war. A sample item from this scale is, "Before this war is over it is likely that the American generals will devise some important new strategy, which will catch the Chinese and North Korean forces virtually totally unprepared." The Consequences of the War Scale (CAB), also appearing in both versions, explored attitudes toward the social, economic, and political consequences of the war. One of its items read, "The exhaustion of natural resources and manpower by our government in the present war will create important problems and difficulties for generations to come."

Unique to the Chinese questionnaire were the Attitude toward Social Improvements Scale (I), which probed personal willingness

*The rapidity of such a procedure makes feasible the use of a series of such questionnaires.

[†]The complete questionnaire is presented in Appendix C. Three items of one scale (Attitude toward Allies) were inapplicable to the NK sample.

[†]Inter-item correlation tables and reliability estimates of the scales are presented in Appendices D and E, respectively.

[†]The scales will be referred to frequently hereafter by the parenthesized abbreviations.

to have foregone or to postpone social reforms and public works in order to further the war effort, and the Attitude toward the Enemy Scale (E), which dealt with such attitudes as whether the people of the UN, or their leaders, were responsible for the war, and whether peace terms should be considered until the UN forces were completely beaten.

Exclusive with the North Korean questionnaire were the War Confidence Scale (W), which dealt with questions such as the military capability of the NK and CCF forces, and the Belief in News Sources Scale (B), which rated the POWs' credibility of government propaganda and the newspapers.

ANALYSIS OF THE DATA


The analysis of the data was in three sections.

1. A description of the Chinese and North Korean POWs' attitudes toward the Korean war.

2. An analysis of the relationship of selected background variables to those attitudes.

3. An analysis of the relationship of capture-surrender behavior to those attitudes.

Categories descriptive of the scale scores were devised, based on the method of item scoring as presented in Appendix A. A complete range of the scale scores as described by these categories is represented by the diagram below. This diagrammatic form is used in describing score distributions and average scores throughout the report. The terms "low," "moderately low," . . . "high," refer to the level of optimism indicated by the scores with respect to the attitudinal dimensions.



Curves are presented in the first section of the analysis, indicating the distributions of scores. The height of a curve at any point represents the number of POWs having a given score. (Obviously, however, equal heights on different curves do not necessarily represent the same number of POWs.)

POWs' ATTITUDES TOWARD THE KOREAN WAR

North Korean POWs' Attitudes

The average POW of the total North Korean group was indifferent. However, the officers varied considerably from the enlisted men. The officers tended to demonstrate optimistic attitudes toward the war and its consequences, and placed considerable confidence in their news sources and in the capability of the NK and




Fig. 1—Distribution of OAB (Military Optimism) Scale Scores of NK POWs

This scale consisted of nine items, and was designed to measure the outlook of the POWs about the course of the war. The curve indicates that the average POW of the total NK group was indifferent. The average officer, who was quite optimistic, differed markedly from the average enlisted man, who was indifferent, but tended toward pessimism.




Fig. 2—Distribution of CAB (Optimism of Consequences of War) Scale Scores of NK POWs

This scale consisted of eight items which tapped the outlooks on social, economic, and political consequences of the war. As a whole the NK POWs seemed to be uncertain or pessimistic about the consequences of the war, the average indicating a stand close to "undecided." Paralleling the results of the OAB Scale (Fig. 1) a considerable difference was found between the attitudes of the officers and the enlisted men. Although the average officer was only slightly optimistic regarding the consequences of the war, nevertheless, he was much more optimistic than the average enlisted man, who was slightly pessimistic.




Fig. 3—Distribution of B (Belief in News Sources) Scale Scores of NK POWs

Consisting of three items, this scale measured the credibility of the POWs regarding the North Korean press and government information service. The average POW of the total NK group reflected an attitude of neither confidence in the news sources nor doubt of them. The difference between the beliefs of the officers and the enlisted men was very large, the average officer considering his news sources to be quite truthful and the average enlisted man tending to be slightly skeptical of their reliability.




Fig. 4—Distribution of W (War Confidence) Scale Scores of NK POWs

The three items in this scale were designed to measure the POWs' confidence in the capability of the NK and CCF. The items were slightly similar to some items of the OAB Scale (Fig. 1), but the content of the scale was far less comprehensive. The average POW of the total NK group evidenced uncertainty. The average officer was decidedly confident, the average enlisted man essentially uncertain, tending toward lack of confidence.

CCF. The enlisted men, except in regard to the capability of their forces, tended to display rather pessimistic attitudes. Figures 1 through 4 are frequency curves of POW scores on the scales tapping these attitudes. Frequency and percentage distributions of these scores are to be found in Appendix H.

Chinese POWs' Attitudes

The average POW of the total Chinese group was indifferent or slightly optimistic. The differences between the Chinese officers and enlisted men were not as great as between NK officers and enlisted men. The Chinese officers tended to be optimistic about the consequences of the war, unfavorable to the enemy, and willing to postpone social improvements to further the war effort. The Chinese enlisted men were less optimistic about the consequences of the war, and manifested considerable indifference in regard to the other two factors. Both officers and enlisted men were characterized by indifference or optimism in regard to the war. Figures 5 through 8 present frequency curves of Chinese POW scores on the scales tapping these attitudes.

Comparison of the Chinese and the North Korean POWs' Attitudes

Both NK and CCF officers displayed considerably more optimistic attitudes than the enlisted men. The North Korean officers were the most optimistic of the four groups; the North Korean enlisted men, the least optimistic. Considering specifically one of the parallel scales of the questionnaire, OAB, it may be noted that the findings were typical: North Korean officers were more optimistic than the Chinese officers, and Chinese enlisted men were more optimistic than the North Korean enlisted men. This pattern of results obtained on the remaining scales, with the exception of CAB, on which a larger percentage of Chinese than North Korean officers were highly optimistic.

**THE RELATIONSHIP OF BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS
OF POWs TO THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARD THE KOREAN WAR**

In this part of the analysis only those background variables were considered which demonstrated the closest relationship. Analysis of the NK data was restricted to the variables of education, length of training, and time in the army; analysis of the CCF data included




Fig. 5—Distribution of OAB (Military Optimism) Scale Scores of CCF POWs

As administered to the Chinese POWs, this scale consisted of seven of the nine items of the same scale that were administered to the NK POWs. These curves show that the average POW of each group, i.e., the officers, the enlisted men, and the total, was somewhat optimistic, the optimism expressed by approximately half of each of the three groups being moderate to high.




Fig. 6—Distribution of CAB (Optimism on Consequences of War) Scale Scores of CCF POWs

This scale, as administered to the Chinese POWs, was identical to that administered to the NK POWs. The curves show that the average POW of the total and enlisted man groups was moderately optimistic about the consequences of the war, while the average officer was decidedly optimistic. In contrast to the OAB scale (Fig. 5), the Chinese officers were definitely more optimistic than the enlisted men.




Fig. 7—Distribution of E (Attitude Toward the Enemy) Scale Scores of CCF POWs

This scale was unique to the Chinese questionnaire, and probed attitudes toward their enemy, the United Nations. Indifference marked the average POW of both the total group and the group of enlisted men. The average officer, however, tended to be unfavorable toward the UN. The officers, as a group, were obviously more unfavorable than the enlisted men.




Fig. 8—Distribution of I (Attitude Toward Social Improvement) Scale Scores of CCF POWs

This scale, also, was unique to the Chinese questionnaire. It dealt, generally, with the desirability of postponing social improvements in order to further the war effort. The average POW of the total group was indifferent to this question. However, considerable difference existed between the average officer and the average enlisted man. The average officer approved such postponement, whereas the average enlisted man was indifferent.

only length of training, civilian occupation, and party membership. Figures 9 through 14 show the average scale scores of POWs in relation to all the variables which were considered. The tabulated data dealing with average scale scores in relation to background characteristics is presented in Appendix I; the method of selection of variables for analysis is shown in Appendix B.

North Korean POWs

For the total sample of NK POWs, greater optimism and confidence was associated with longer service in the army, with longer training, and with more education. Among the officer group an increased belief in news sources was noted with a longer education; otherwise, officer attitudes did not vary significantly in relation to these variables.* Significant differences in the attitudes of enlisted men were found only in relation to length of training. This slight trend toward greater optimism with longer training must be interpreted cautiously because of the small size of the sample having longer training. Differences between officers and enlisted men were greater than differences within either group, suggesting that factors distinguishing officers and enlisted men, such as indoctrination and party loyalty, were associated with the attitudes tapped by the scales at least as strongly as the variables examined.

CCF POWs

For the total Chinese group longer training was associated with greater optimism in regard to the consequences of the war and more unfavorable attitudes toward the enemy. Students were more optimistic than businessmen, and the farmer group was least optimistic of the three groups.

Among the Chinese officers, the trends noted for occupation were found. In respect to their political party membership, Kuomintang members were more optimistic in regard to the consequences of the war than were Communists (who were moderately optimistic), and, though differences were not large, Kuomintang members were slightly more optimistic than New Democratic Youth League members, and Communists were slightly less optimistic. Officers having less than four months, and those having more than twelve months training were more optimistic about the consequences of the war and more favorable to the postponement of social improve-

*Because of the large N of some of the samples, differences between means so slight as to be meaningless might nonetheless be statistically significant. Therefore, additional criteria of significant differences were utilized. They are described in Appendix A.




Fig. 9—Average Scale Scores of NK POWs with Varying Education

A decided trend is apparent for the total NK group on all four scales: longer education is associated with greater optimism in regard to the war and its consequences, greater belief of news sources, and greater confidence in the military capability of the NK and the CCF. Considering the officer and enlisted groups separately, it is seen that the better educated officers regarded their news sources as more trustworthy (Scale B); on all remaining scales no significant variation appeared for either the officers or enlisted men.

The significant differences between officers and enlisted men, and the lack of differences within either group, suggest that these attitudinal differences existing between officers and enlisted men were a function of factors in addition to education, such as length of army training and the degree of identification with the Communist cause. The training time of officers tended to be considerably longer than that of enlisted men, and training programs of communist armies include extensive ideological indoctrination. In addition, attainment of positions of leadership in communist organizations was dependent to a considerable extent on demonstrated adherence to the party "line." Thus it might well be expected that officers would be more optimistic and confident than enlisted men.


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Fig. 10—Average Scale Scores of NK POWs with Varying Length of Training

Among the total NK group, longer training was associated with greater optimism in regard to the war and its consequences, greater confidence in their news sources, and in the capabilities of the CCF and NK forces.* Within the officer group no such trend was in evidence, however; differences in length of training among officers produced no significant variation in attitudes as represented by average scores. A slight trend toward a positive relationship was evident among the enlisted men, but the groups of enlisted men having seven to nine months training or ten to twelve months training were composed of only sixteen and nine POWs respectively, and for this reason, such a trend must be regarded cautiously. Thus, the differences between the officers and the enlisted men were of a much larger magnitude than the differences within either group.

As training in the NK Army is largely equivalent to indoctrination, the officers, having a longer training period than the enlisted men, might reasonably be expected to display more optimistic attitudes and greater identification with the Communist cause. That their attitudes varied so little regardless of length of training, however, definitely indicated the existence of other contributing factors. As noted earlier, a complex of factors including education, length and type of training (indoctrination), and political loyalty, has been posited as distinguishing officers from enlisted men.

* Because of small N's, averages of certain subsamples (not illustrated) were not computed. Neither are the total subsamples which included such groups illustrated.




Fig. 11—Average Scale Scores of NK POWs with Varying Length of Time in Army

For the total NK group, longer time in the army was associated with greater optimism in regard to the war and its consequences, and greater confidence in their news sources, and in the capabilities of the NK and CCF. Length of time in the army did not appear to be directly associated with the differences in attitudes among officers, however. The attitudes of the enlisted men, though not varying significantly, were consistent in presenting a pattern of decreasing optimism, confidence, and belief in news sources with increasing time in the army. Indoctrination (and related factors) may have served to produce a level of optimism among the officers not influenced by the length of time in the army, although, among the enlisted men, it appears that indoctrination produced no such effect.

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


Fig. 12—Average Scale Scores of CCF POWs with Varying Civilian Occupations

In considering the Chinese group as a whole in terms of occupation it can be seen that a pattern prevailed on all scales but OAB: former students were the most optimistic group, businessmen were somewhat less optimistic, and farmers were the least optimistic of the three groups. On both the I and the E scales the attitudes of farmers and students differed significantly. The same pattern of relationship of occupation to optimism was displayed by the officers. In contrast, no trend toward a relationship between optimism and former civilian occupation was shown in the attitudes of the enlisted men.




Fig. 13--Average Scale Scores of CCF POWs with Varying Political Party Memberships

No consistent relationship between political party membership and the attitudes of the total Chinese group was evident. Among the officers a pattern was apparent, although the differences in attitudes were slight. Kuomintang members demonstrated greater optimism than members of any other party on all scales; New Democratic Youth League members were somewhat less optimistic, and Communist adherents even less so. Among the enlisted men, on both OAB and CAB scales, New Democratic Youth League Members were significantly more optimistic than Communists. On both scales, the attitudinal position of Kuomintang members was established between that of the other two groups.




Fig. 14—Average Scale Scores of CCF POWs with Varying Length of Training

For the total Chinese group, significant differences in attitudes were found on both the CAB and the E scales. Those POWs with more than a year of training were more optimistic about the consequences of the war than those with a shorter training period of seven to nine months. Those POWs with more than a year of training were more unfavorable in their attitudes toward the enemy than those with a training period of less than four months. Although no consistent trends were evident among the enlisted men, significant differences in attitudes were found among the officers on both the CAB and the I scales. Those officer-POWs having seven to nine months training were less optimistic about the consequences of the war, and less favorable to the postponement of social improvements to further the war effort, than those having more than a year of training. In addition, although the differences were not of a significant magnitude, those officers having seven to nine months training were less optimistic in regard to these two aspects than officers having shorter training periods.

ments than officers having seven to nine months training. Among the enlisted men, New Democratic Youth League members were more optimistic in regard to the war and its consequences than Kuomintang members, and Communist party members were somewhat less optimistic than Kuomintang members.

CAPTURE-SURRENDER BEHAVIOR AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THE KOREAN WAR

Inasmuch as one aim of United Nations propaganda was to encourage enemy surrender, knowledge of the relationship of capture-surrender behavior to the attitudinal areas explored in this study is of interest, and may serve to increase the effectiveness of surrender psywar.* Figures 15 and 16 show average scale scores of




Fig. 15—Average Scale Scores of NK and CCF Officer and Enlisted Capturees and Surrenderers

An examination of the attitudes of NK POWs shows that both officer and enlisted capturees were more optimistic than the surrenderers.* Among the enlisted men, significant differences in attitudes existed between capturees and surrenderers on all scales. Among the officers, the differences between capturees and surrenderers were significant on only two scales, OAB and B. Differences in attitudes associated with rank were often as large as, or larger than, differences associated with capture-surrender behavior. Specifically, attitudes of the enlisted man, capturee group, differed more from the enlisted man, surrender group than from the officer surrender group. In contrast, none of the differences among the Chinese officers and enlisted men were of a significant magnitude, except on the CAB scale. The differences between officer capturees and surrenderers and enlisted capturees and surrenderers were of approximately equal magnitude.

*Tabulated data of this analysis is presented in Appendix K.

*Capture-surrender behavior was designated on the basis of a seven-item scale, "Degree of Resistance to Capture-Surrender," which is presented in Appendix J. Response patterns were categorized by Guttman scale analysis, and the resulting scale scores dichotomized.

both capturees and surrenderers of the total officer and enlisted men samples. These two figures illustrate that, whereas the attitudes of the Chinese capturees, on the whole, did not differ significantly from those of the Chinese surrenderers, the North Korean capturees tended to display greater optimism in regard to the war and its consequences, and greater confidence in their new sources and the military capabilities of the NK and the CCF than North Korean surrenderers.




Fig. 16—Average Scale Scores of Total Sample of NK and CCF Capturees and Surrenderers

It can be seen that far less difference existed between the attitudes of the Chinese capturees and surrenderers than between those of the North Korean capturees and surrenderers. NK surrenderers were distinctly less optimistic than the other three groups.

APPENDIX A

METHOD OF ANALYSIS

CONTENTS

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A1. Scale Scores Defining Levels of Optimism	30

METHOD OF ANALYSIS

The interpretation of scale scores paralleled the interpretation of individual item scores. Items were in the form of statements which were answered by checking one of five possible responses: "strongly disagree," "disagree," "undecided," "agree," and "strongly agree." Numerical values ranging from 1 to 5 were assigned in such a manner that responses indicative of highly optimistic attitudes received a score of 5, and responses indicative of highly pessimistic attitudes received a score of 1. The remaining intermediate responses were assigned the scores of 2, 3, and 4, in a comparable fashion.

It was assumed that a meaningful difference in attitudes existed between response categories of the 5-point continuum. Such a difference, manifested consistently—that is, on all items of a scale, was considered to be definitive of distinct attitudinal positions, a significant difference. This difference (termed a scale step) is equal to the one point difference in score between response categories, multiplied by the number of items of the scale. A difference of half that magnitude was considered significant, but to a lesser extent. The scale step criterion gains support from the finding that deviations of such an amount from the midpoints of the scales provide cut-off points above or below which the numbers of capturees and surrenderers are highly disproportionate.

Utilizing these criteria of significant differences (0.9 and 0.4 of a scale step determined significant differences), ranges of scores were designated in either direction from the midpoint of the range of scale scores. This midpoint represented an attitude of indifference, its numerical value being equivalent, for example, to the score obtained by a POW responding "undecided" to all items of a scale. Scores 0.9 or more of a scale step lower than the midpoint were considered indicative of highly pessimistic attitudes; those 0.9 or more of a scale step higher than the midpoint, indicative of highly optimistic attitudes. Scores deviating from the midpoint by a magnitude of at least 0.4 but less than 0.9 of a scale step were considered indicative of moderately pessimistic attitudes, if lower than

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the midpoint, or of moderately optimistic attitudes, if higher than the midpoint. Scores deviating from the midpoint by less than 0.4 of a scale step were considered indicative of indifference. The score value of these points are presented in Table A1.

TABLE A1
SCALE SCORES DEFINING LEVELS OF OPTIMISM

North Korean						
scale	Low	Moderately Low	Indifference	Moderately High	High	
OAB	9	18.9	23.4	30.6	35.1	45
CAB	8	16.8	20.8	27.2	31.2	40
B	3	6.3	7.8	10.2	11.7	15
W	3	6.3	7.8	10.2	11.7	15

Chinese						
scale	Low	Moderately Low	Indifference	Moderately High	High	
OAB	7	14.7	18.2	23.8	27.3	35
CAB	8	16.8	20.8	27.2	31.2	40
E	4	8.4	10.4	13.6	15.6	20
I	4	8.4	10.4	13.6	15.6	20

Use of these criteria of significant differences was made in comparing intragroup mean scores in relation to background characteristics, inasmuch as the size of many of the sub-samples precluded use of the usual statistical techniques for testing the significance of the difference between means; that is, differences statistically significant—because of the large number of respondents—might nonetheless be so small as to have no practical meaning. Therefore, throughout this report, the term "significant difference" is used in the non-statistical sense, although all such reported differences also are significant statistically.

APPENDIX B

SELECTION OF BACKGROUND VARIABLES FOR ANALYSIS

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B1. Number of Scales on which Significant Differences Occur Between Intragroup Mean Scores	33

SELECTION OF BACKGROUND VARIABLES FOR ANALYSIS

The degree of relationship between background characteristics and scale scores was determined by the frequency and magnitude of differences between means of subgroups as they were categorized in terms of background characteristics. These frequencies are shown in Table B1, indicating the number of scales on which the largest difference between means was at least 0.9 of a scale step, the number of scales on which the largest difference ranged from 0.4 to 0.9 of a scale step, and the number of scales on which no difference between means was as large as 0.4 of a scale step. By weighting each of these differences as shown in the last row of the table, a score was assigned to each background variable indicative of its degree of relationship to the attitudes measured by the scales. Analysis was restricted to the three highest scoring variables for each sample.

TABLE B1
NUMBER OF SCALES ON WHICH SIGNIFICANT
DIFFERENCES OCCUR BETWEEN INTRAGROUP MEAN SCORES
(Based on data of the total samples)

Variable	Magnitude of Largest Differences (in scale step increments)						Score $(W_1C_1 + W_2C_2 + W_3C_3)^a$	
	C ₁ >0.9		C ₂ >0.4 < 0.9		C ₃ <0.4			
	NK	CCF	NK	CCF	NK	CCF	NK	CCF
Age	—	—	3	—	1	4	6	0
Time in Army	3	—	1	—	—	4	14	0
Length of Training	4	—	—	2	—	2	16	4
Time in Combat	—	—	4	—	—	4	8	0
Education	3	—	1	1	—	3	14	2
Civilian Occupation	—	—	3	2	1	2	6	4
Branch of Military Service	—	—	4	1	—	3	8	2
Political Party Membership	1	—	3	2	—	2	10	4
Date of Capture	—	—	4	1	—	3	8	2
Weight (W)		4		2		0		

^aSum of weighted column frequencies.

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APPENDIX C

MILITARY OPTIMISM QUESTIONNAIRE

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MILITARY OPTIMISM QUESTIONNAIRE

(The score given to a response of "Strongly Disagree" is indicated by the parenthesized number following an item)

Military Optimism Scale: OA

ITEM NUMBERS	ITEMS
OA-1*	Before this war is over it is likely that the American generals will devise some important new strategy, which will catch the Chinese and North Korean forces virtually totally unprepared. (5)
OA-2*	Man for man, the military commanders of the Chinese and North Korean forces are probably considerably inferior to those of the American forces at the present time. (5)
OA-3*	In this war, the natural advantages of geography lie principally with the American forces. (5)
OA-4*	The American forces will probably respond to intensive bombing with just as much heroism and morale as the Chinese and Koreans. (5)
OA-5*	It will probably take the Chinese and North Korean forces — one year two years three years four years five or more years — to win this war. (one year-5)

Military Optimism Scale: OB

OB-1†	Before this war is over, the Americans will probably conduct important bombing raids on various industrial centers in China. (5)
-------	--

*Items retained in both North Korean and Chinese versions.
†Items retained in only the North Korean version.

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OB-2*

Before the end of the war, it is likely that our Chinese and North Korean troops will be afflicted by some serious disaster such as a complete breakdown in the food supply system. (5)

OB-3†

Before the war is over it is likely that the American technicians will produce some important new weapon, which will catch the Chinese and North Korean forces totally unprepared. (5)

OB-4†

Since the Chinese and North Korean nations are composed of culturally diverse and geographically separated nations, our "unified high command" will always be decidedly less efficient than the high command of the Americans. (5)

OB-5

America and its allies, while not strong enough to win this war, may still be strong enough to prevent a clear, decisive victory by their opponents, China and North Korea.

Optimism on Consequences of War Scale: CA

CA-1†

It is probable that, despite all the talk and planning and control of the home economy, the standard of living back home will continue to fall during the present war. (5)

CA-2

Even if China/North Korea is admitted to the United Nations after this war, it will probably derive little benefit from its participation.

CA-3†

The exhaustion of natural resources and manpower by our government in the present war will create important problems and difficulties for generations to come. (5)

CA-4

After this war, there will be more hatred among peoples and nations than there ever was before.

*Items retained in only the North Korean version.

†Items retained in both North Korean and Chinese versions.

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CA-5 After the war a new and stronger home rule will arise which, by its political power, will force extravagant and bankrupting practices on the people.

CA-6 Due to the economic exhaustion of war, the people in both victorious and vanquished countries will, after this war, have to get along at a decidedly lower standard of living than they enjoyed before.

CA-7* The increasing participation of whole families in the war effort is going to result in significantly poorer training of children, breaking of traditional family ties, etc. (5)

Optimism on Consequences of War Scale: CB

CB-1 There is probably just as much profiteering during this war as in the war against Japan, even though the profiteering now may be better concealed.

CB-2 Regardless of any United Nations organization or court in which China/North Korea might participate after this war, the selfish devotion of people to their own "national interests" will lead to fresh international conflicts and new wars.

CB-3* Before this war is over, there will probably be acute shortages of many necessities for the civilian population of China/North Korea. (5)

CB-4* It will take generations to repair the widespread physical damage caused by the present war. (5)

CB-5* As the present war against the United Nations forces continues, those at home will probably be governed more and more by executive orders or decrees rather than by democratically formulated laws. (5)

*Items retained in both North Korean and Chinese versions.

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CB-6* After the war, it is practically inevitable that the closing of war industries will result in extremely widespread unemployment, famine, and profound economic chaos. (5)

CB-7* As the war continues, it is inevitable that the over-all culture and social structure at home will deteriorate. (5)

Attitude toward Allies Scale: A[†]

A-1 I think that we should make every effort to continue to send war supplies to the North Koreans.

A-2 I think that we should start keeping our tanks and planes for our own forces instead of giving them to the North Koreans.

A-3 I think that we have been sending the North Koreans too many of the war supplies that we need to defend ourselves.

A-4 It looks as though the North Koreans/Chinese are not proving to be very strong allies.

A-5 I think that we can trust North Korea/China to keep her promise to us and not conclude a separate peace with the United States.

Attitude toward Enemy Scale: E

E-1* If the United Nations is beaten in this war, the organization should be dissolved and never allowed to reform. (1)

E-2* The people of the nations participating in this war against China and North Korea are as much to blame for this war as are their leaders. (1)

*Items retained in both North Korean and Chinese versions.

†Items A-1, A-2, and A-3 did not appear in original North Korean version.

‡Items retained in Chinese version only.

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ITEM NUMBERS	ITEMS
E-3*	I think that China and North Korea should not consider any peace terms until the United Nations are completely beaten. (1)
E-4*	I think that on the average the white people are less intelligent than the Chinese or North Koreans. (1)

Attitude toward Government Scale: G

G-1	People with political pull or special privileges get the best jobs in our government regardless of their abilities.
G-2	Without sweeping changes in our government little progress can be made in the solution of social problems of China/North Korea.
G-3	Whether it is communistic or fascistic every government grabs whatever it can get away with.
G-4	People back home should not be asked to volunteer for defense work unless that work cannot be done any other way.
G-5	I think that most of China's/North Korea's military leaders should be replaced with younger men.

Personal Morale Scale: PM

PM-1	It is great to be living in these times when so much is going on.
PM-2	It is easy to keep up one's courage.
PM-3	The future seems hopeless to me.
PM-4	The future is too uncertain for a person to make serious plans.

*Items retained in only the Chinese version.

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War Confidence Scale: W

W-1* China/North Korea will soon have the best army in the world. (1)

W-2* The Chinese and North Korean nations are certain to win this war. (1)

W-3* There is no real danger of bombing the China mainland. (1)

Belief in News Sources Scale: B

B-1* I think that the Chinese/North Korean people are getting a reasonably truthful and complete account of this war. (1)

B-2* You can't believe much of what you read in the Chinese/North Korean newspapers these days. (5)

B-3* I think that the Chinese/North Korean public is being misled as to the true course of the war by government propaganda. (5)

Attitudes toward Social Improvements Scale: I

I-1† Money that is being spent at home for construction of new roads, bridges, houses, etc. in the last few years could have been better used for the production of tanks and planes. (1)

I-2 I do not think government officials at home should withhold any news of the war from the public, whether the news be good or bad.

I-3† Much of the money now being spent at home on such things as education should be used more widely for defense purposes. (1)

*Items retained in only the North Korean version.
†Items retained in only the Chinese version.

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ITEM NUMBERS	ITEMS
I-4	This war is not worth fighting if we must give up all of our democratic rights in order to win it.
I-5	There is such a thing as too much freedom of speech and freedom of the press in time of war.
I-6	I think it would be unpatriotic to criticize our home government policies in time of war.
I-7*	I think that the social reforms instituted by the Peoples Government of China/North Korea should be stopped for the duration of the war and the money spent on war materials. (1)
I-8*	During the present national emergency, the right of the laboring class in China/North Korea should be suppressed. (1)

Support of the War Scale: S

S-1	We are really fighting more to protect the bureaucrats in Peking/Pyongyang rather than preserve the integrity of China/North Korea.
S-2	The gods are on the side of China and North Korea.
S-3	The victory of the United Nations in the present war would have such extremely bad consequences for China and North Korea that it is worth every effort to prevent such a victory.
S-4	There is such a thing as a just war.

Single Item: O

O-1	The United Nations leaders rather than their people are our real enemies in this war.
-----	---

*Items retained in only the Chinese version.

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Attitude toward People in General Scale: P*

P-1 I think that most Chinese/North Koreans are doing all that can reasonably be expected of them to help win this war.

P-2 I don't blame anyone for trying to grab everything he can get in this world.

P-3 I am against giving money to beggars.

P-4 Most people will use somewhat unfair means to gain profit or an advantage rather than lose it.

*Scale deleted from both questionnaires prior to analysis.

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APPENDIX D

INTER-ITEM TETRACHORIC CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS

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INTER-ITEM TETRACHORIC CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS

OAB Scale - North Korean

Items	OA					OB				
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	
OA	1		.42	.42	.36	.24	.51	.52	.52	.32
	2			.60	.31	.60	.48	.74	.70	.73
	3				.32	.28	.31	.60	.57	.50
	4					.20	.22	.42	.42	.27
	5						.41	.43	.29	.48
OB	1							.87	.36	.43
	2								.66	.65
	3									.55
	4									

CAB Scale - North Korean

Items	CB					CA			
	3	4	5	6	7	1	3	7	
CB	3		.36	.40	.34	.40	.56	.51	.58
	4			.23	.40	.24	.28	.36	.36
	5				.35	.22	.31	.21	.26
	6					.35	.30	.36	.43
	7						.45	.35	.42
CA	1						.40	.51	
	3							.69	
	7								

B Scale - North Korean

Items	1	2	3
1		.45	.59
2			.72
3			

W Scale - North Korean

Items	1	2	3
1		.69	.42
2			.35
3			

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I Scale - Chinese

Items	1	3	7	8
1		.25	.48	.47
3			.44	.20
7				.25
8				

E Scale - Chinese

Items	1	2	3	4
1			.32	.42
2				.43
3				.52
4				

OAB Scale - Chinese

Items	OA					OB	
	1	2	3	4	5	3	4
OA	1		.27	.32	.34	.17	.40
	2			.42	.39	.29	.49
	3				.43	.24	.48
	4					.25	.49
	5						.28
OB	3						.41
	4						.14

CAB Scale - Chinese

Items	CA			CB			
	1	3	7	3	4	5	6
CA	1		.48	.56	.38	.28	.50
	3			.62	.16	.39	.47
	7				.13	.27	.52
CB	3					.12	.28
	4						.19
	5						.49
	6						.36
	7						.44

SECURITY **CONFIDENTIAL** INFORMATION

APPENDIX E

KUDER-RICHARDSON RELIABILITY
ESTIMATES OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE SCALES

SECURITY **CONFIDENTIAL** INFORMATION

KUDER-RICHARDSON RELIABILITY ESTIMATES
OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE SCALES

North Korean Scales N = 1789*			Chinese Scales N = 1056*		
Scale	Number of Items	R	Scale	Number of Items	R
OAB	9	.87	OAB	7	.64
CAB	8	.77	CAB	8	.71
B	3	.75	I	4	.52
W	3	.70	E	4	.57

*Reduction in Ns occasioned by removal of incomplete questionnaires.

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APPENDIX F

BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE CHINESE AND NORTH KOREAN SAMPLES

SECURITY **CONFIDENTIAL** INFORMATION

BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHINESE
AND NORTH KOREAN SAMPLES

	CCF (N = 1124)		NK (N = 1918)	
A. AGE	N	%	N	%
16-20	147	13.1	402	21.2
21-25	441	39.5	696	36.5
26-30	328	29.4	468	24.6
31-35	148	13.3	236	12.4
Over 36	52	4.7	100	5.2
No Answer	8	—	16	—
MDN	25.2		24.5	
Q	3.65		4.02	
B. EDUCATION (in years)	N	%	N	%
0-3	778	70.7	704	38.0
4-6	145	13.2	677	36.4
7-9	88	8.0	237	12.8
Over 9	89	8.1	237	12.8
No Answer	24	—	63	—
MDN	1.5		5.2	
Q	1.4		2.96	
C. CIVILIAN OCCUPATION^a	N	%	N	%
Farmer	668	61.5	1123	59.4
Worker	155	14.3	391	20.6
Student	185	17.1	288	15.1
Public Official	10	.9	25	1.3
Businessman	70	6.4	38	2.0
Other	21	2.0	62	3.3
No Answer	39	—	—	—
^a Percentage totals are over 100% since some POWs claimed more than one occupation.				
D. POLITICAL PARTY MEMBERSHIP^b	N	%	N	%
Dem. Youth League	47	4.2	793	41.3
Labor (Comm)	59	5.2	86	4.4
Democratic	—	—	60	3.1
Kuomintang	130	11.6	—	—
Other	19	1.6	68	3.5
None or No Answer	902	80.2	962	50.1

^bPercentages are of the total sample and total over 100% since some POWs claimed membership in more than one party.

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CCF
(N = 1124)

NK
(N = 1918)

E. LENGTH OF IMPRISONMENT (in months) ^c	N	%	Months	N	%
0-2	744	67.2	0-1	327	17.6
2-6	329	29.6	1-2	173	9.3
6-10	34	3.1	2-9	112	6.0
No Answer	17	-	9-15	1253	67.1
			No Answer	53	-
MDN		1.58	MDN		10.00
Q		1.15	Q		5.00

^cMonths of imprisonment are as of 15 September 1951.

F. MILITARY RANK	N	%		N	%
Pvt.	748	67.3	Pvt.	1320	70.0
Unit Ldr.	38	3.4	Cpt.	28	1.5
Sub-Sq. Ldr.	36	3.2	Sgt.	9	0.5
Sq. Ldr.	59	5.3	Sr. Sgt.	2	0.1
Sub-Pl. Ldr.	65	5.8	Jr. Lt.	406	21.6
Pl. Ldr.	126	11.3	Lt.	69	3.7
Co. Ldr.	33	3.0	Capt.	50	2.7
Bn. Ldr.	6	0.5	Major	3	.1
No Answer	13	-	Col.	1	-
			Sr. Col.	1	-
			No Answer	29	-
EM	881	79.2	EM	1359	72
OFF	230	21.8	OFF	530	28

G. MILITARY BRANCH	N	%		N	%
Infantry	757	68.7		1329	69.4
Artillery	168	15.2		259	13.5
Signal Corps	59	5.4		70	3.6
QM	18	1.6		60	3.2
Transportation	36	3.3		64	3.3
Medical	18	1.6		46	2.4
Tank Corps	3	.3		19	1.0
Other	43	3.9		64	3.0
No Answer	22	-		7	-

H. TIME IN ARMY (in months)	N	%		N	%
0-4	151	13.7		1364	73.2
5-8	303	27.5		156	8.4
9-12	98	8.9		120	6.4
13-24	125	11.4		132	7.0
Over 25	423	38.5		89	4.8
No Answer	24	-		57	-
MDN		12.0			3.4
Q		9.60			1.60

I. TIME IN COMBAT (in months)	CCF (N = 1124)		NK (N = 1918)	
	N	%	N	%
Less than one	228	20.8	1146	67.1
1-2	621	56.8	437	25.5
3-4	101	9.2	82	4.8
Over 5	144	13.2	43	2.5
No Answer	30	-	210	-
MDN		1.5		.7
Q		.25		.21

A. Age. A similarity of age distribution was found between the North Korean and Chinese samples, the median age being approximately 25 years for both groups. It may be noted that whereas the North Korean sample had a considerable percentage more men in the 16-20 age bracket than the Chinese, this difference was assimilated in the next two brackets in such a manner that remaining variances between the composition of the samples were negligible.

B. Education. Although both samples were poorly educated, the North Koreans had slightly better educated troops. Seventy percent of the Chinese had 3 years' or less schooling, whereas approximately 38 percent of the North Koreans had 3 years' or less, and approximately 36 percent had between 4 and 6 years' schooling.

C. Civilian Occupation. The samples were quite similar in respect to civilian occupation. Farmers were most numerous, constituting 60 percent of both the Chinese and North Korean samples. Slightly over 30 percent of both Chinese and North Korean groups were workers and students.

D. Political Party Membership. Eighty percent of the Chinese respondents and 50 percent of the North Koreans claimed no political affiliation. Communist party affiliation--the Democratic Youth League and the Labor party--were claimed by most of the remaining North Koreans, although these Communist parties had little representation in the Chinese sample.

E. Length of Imprisonment. The North Korean sample differed considerably from the Chinese sample in respect to length of imprisonment; 67 percent of the North Koreans had been imprisoned 9 to 15 months, whereas the same percent of the Chinese had been imprisoned only 2 months or less.

F. Rank. The ratio of enlisted men to officers was roughly 3 to 1 in both samples. Approximately 70 percent of the respondents, both Chinese and North Korean, had been privates.

G. Branch of Service. Both the Chinese and North Korean samples were composed predominantly of POWs who had served in the infantry and artillery branches of their armies; roughly 70 percent had been in the former, and approximately 15 percent in the latter.

H. Time in Army. The North Korean sample was composed largely of quite "green" troops, while the Chinese sample had more experience. Approximately 75 percent of the North Koreans had been in the army 4 months or less and approximately 50 percent of the Chinese had been in the army a year or longer.

I. Time in Combat. Both samples were relatively inexperienced in terms of time in combat; 20 percent of the Chinese and almost 70 percent of the North Koreans had less than a month of combat experience. Approximately 60 percent of the Chinese and 25 percent of the North Koreans had between 1 and 2 months of combat experience. Thus, about 80 percent of the Chinese and 90 percent of the North Korean respondents were soldiers with 2 months' or less time in combat.

SECURITY **CONFIDENTIAL** INFORMATION

APPENDIX G

QUESTIONNAIRE AND DEMONSTRATION INSTRUCTIONS

SECURITY **CONFIDENTIAL** INFORMATION

QUESTIONNAIRE AND DEMONSTRATION INSTRUCTIONS

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS AND INSTRUCTIONS
(To be read by supervisor)

The statements presented on the following pages represent typical opinions held on a variety of topics by many people throughout the world. Until now, we, as scientists interested in studying the opinions of people, have had no opportunity of finding out how Chinese/North Koreans feel about these matters. You, as a Chinese/North Korean prisoner of war, represent a first opportunity for us to study these matters. We, therefore, sincerely hope that you will cooperate with us by filling in this questionnaire conscientiously and honestly.

Before proceeding to fill in this questionnaire, we would like to present a few suggestions which will be helpful to you.

1. Please do not print or sign your name, address, or former military organization to any part of this questionnaire. SINCE YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO GIVE ANY INFORMATION THAT CAN BE USED TO IDENTIFY YOU, WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL NOT HESITATE TO ANSWER HONESTLY AND FRANKLY. WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT YOUR ANSWERING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE WILL IN NO MANNER AFFECT YOUR TREATMENT HERE AS A PRISONER OF WAR.

2. As mentioned previously, the statements used in this questionnaire represent the opinions of many people; that is, on any given statement, there are people who believe that it is true, there are others who believe the statement to be false, and there are still others who hold no opinion about the matter at all. IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD, THEREFORE, THAT THERE ARE NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS TO ANY OF THE STATEMENTS YOU WILL FIND IN THIS QUESTIONNAIRE. YOU SHOULD ANSWER EACH OF THE STATEMENTS ACCORDING TO YOUR OWN OPINION OR BELIEF: REMEMBER, THERE ARE NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS!

3. For purposes of scientific analysis, it is necessary that each respondent makes sure that he answers all of the statements included in the questionnaire. WHEN YOU HAVE FINISHED FILLING IN THE QUESTIONNAIRE, KINDLY CHECK YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE FORM TO MAKE SURE THAT YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL OF THE ITEMS.

4. On the next two (2) pages you will find a series of questions about yourself, the answers to which will be very helpful in scientifically analyzing your answers to the statements.

WE WOULD LIKE TO REMIND YOU AGAIN THAT NONE OF THIS INFORMATION ABOUT YOURSELF CAN BE USED TO IDENTIFY YOU: YOU MAY THEREFORE ANSWER THE ITEMS FRANKLY AND HONESTLY.

Background Data

1. AGE: 15-20 (); 21-25 (); 26-30 (); 31-35 ();
36-40 (); 41-45 (); Over 45 ().

2. RANK:

NK: Private ()
Cpl (); Sgt. (); Sr Sgt. ().
Jr Lt (); Lt. (); Capt. (); Major ();
Col. (); Sr. Col. ().

CCF: Private ()
Unit Ldr. (); Sub-sqd Ldr. (); Sqd Ldr. ();
Sub-Pl. Ldr. (); Pl. Ldr. (); Co. Ldr. ();
Bn. Ldr. (); Rgt. Ldr. (); Div Ldr. ().

3. MILITARY SERVICE

A. Total time in Army (in months): 0-4 (); 5-8 ();
9-12 (); 13-16 (); 17-20 (); 21-24 ();
Over 24 ().

B. Length of training (in months): 0-3 (); 4-6 ();
7-9 (); 10-12 (); Over 12 ().

C. Time in combat (in months): None (); 1-2 ();
3-4 (); 5-6 (); 7-8 (); 9-10 ().

4. MARITAL STATUS: Married (); Single ().

5. EDUCATION (in years): None (); 1-3 (); 4-6 ();
7-9 (); 10-12 (); Over 12 ().

6. CIVILIAN OCCUPATION: Farmer (); Fisherman (); Miner (); Businessman (); Public Official (); Student (); Professional (e.g., Lawyer, doctor, educator, pharmacist, etc.) ().
7. RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE: None (); Buddhist (); Taoist (); Chondokyo (); Christian (); Mohammedan (); Confucianist ().
8. BRANCH OF MILITARY SERVICE: Infantry (); Artillery (); Tank Corps (); Transportation (); Ordnance (); Air Corps (); Quartermaster (); Political Propaganda Section (); Medical ().

9. PARTY OR ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP:

NK: Labor Party (); Democratic Party (); Democratic Youth League (); Chondokyo Party (); Kukminhoo (); Kuomintang (); Socialist Party (Sahootang) ().

CCF: Communist Party (); Democratic Youth League (); Kuomintang Party ().

10. PARTY OR ORGANIZATION PARTICIPATION:

N If the respondent has not been an actual member of any of the above listed parties, but has participated in their activities O in any manner, kindly indicate this fact by placing the symbol T E o next to the appropriate party listed in Item 9 above.

11. KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS ACTIVITIES:

A. Has the Respondent ever heard about the United Nations?

YES () NO ()

B. Can the respondent estimate the extent of his knowledge about the United Nations?

MUCH () SOME () LITTLE () NONE ()

C. From what source did the respondent obtain his information about the United Nations?

Newspapers (); Radio (); Lectures or School (); Magazines, books, etc. (); From other people ().

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12. CIRCUMSTANCE OF BECOMING A PRISONER OF WAR:

A. Captured (); Surrendered ().

B. Date of Capture/Surrender:

NK: 25 June 1950 - 15 July 1950 ()
16 July 1950 - 20 August 1950 ()
21 August 1950 - 20 September 1950 ()
21 September 1950 - 15 October 1950 ()
16 October 1950 - 15 November 1950 ()
16 November 1950 - 25 November 1950 ()
26 November 1950 - 20 January 1951 ()
21 January 1951 - 10 February 1951 ()
11 February 1951 - 15 March 1951 ()
16 March 1951 - PRESENT ()

CCF: 15 November 1950 - 25 November 1950 ()
26 November 1950 - 20 January 1951 ()
21 January 1951 - 10 February 1951 ()
11 February 1951 - 15 March 1951 ()
16 March 1951 - 15 April 1951 ()
16 April 1951 - 15 May 1951 ()
16 May 1951 - 15 June 1951 ()
16 June 1951 - PRESENT ()

DEMONSTRATION

INSTRUCTIONS ON MARKING THE ANSWERS
(To be read and demonstrated by supervisor)

You will find to the right of each statement in the questionnaire a series of five (5) squares; these squares have been placed to the right of each of the items so as to provide for five (5) possible answers. The five (5) possible answers are given at the top of the first item on Page 1 of the questionnaire; these are; STRONGLY AGREE, AGREE, UNDECIDED, DISAGREE, AND STRONGLY DISAGREE. Each of these possible answer categories expresses a different shade of opinion, ranging from feeling very strongly in favor to feeling very strongly against what the statement says. For those who have no opinion or who cannot make up their mind as to how they feel about a given item, the answer category of "undecided" has been provided.

Now, you are required to select and mark with an "X" the square of that answer category which best describes your feeling or opinion about the particular statement. LET YOUR OWN PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OR FEELING DETERMINE YOUR ANSWER. YOU WILL MARK ONLY ONE ANSWER FOR EACH STATEMENT.

To illustrate the manner in which you are to mark your answers, the following demonstration is given. The statement used in this example is not included in the main questionnaire.

DEMONSTRATION

"All men are born free and equal" () (x) () () ()

In the case of this sample statement, an "X" has been placed in the "AGREE" answer category. This means that any person who marks this answer category feels that the statement is true. It should be remembered, however, that other respondents might mark a different answer category in response to this item. Thus, some might have just disagreed with it, others might have strongly agreed with the item, and still others might not have any opinion at all.

If you have any difficulty in answering any of the items, do not hesitate to call upon the supervisor for help.

SECURITY **CONFIDENTIAL** INFORMATION

APPENDIX H

FREQUENCY AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTIONS
OF NORTH KOREAN AND CHINESE POWs' SCALE SCORES

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FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF NORTH KOREAN POWs' SCALE SCORES

Score Interval	OAB Scale			CAB Scale		
	Officers	EM	Total	Officers	EM	Total
8-10	—	14	14	1	47	48
11-13	—	88	88	—	95	95
14-16	—	99	99	9	219	228
17-19	1	157	158	21	325	346
20-22	1	210	211	65	288	353
23-25	8	235	243	64	182	246
26-28	30	225	255	81	85	166
29-31	75	126	201	101	37	137
32-34	89	70	159	72	17	89
35-37	107	39	146	40	5	45
38-40	80	22	102	31	4	35
41-43	67	16	83	—	—	—
44-46	27	3	30	—	—	—
Mean	35.5	23.6	26.8	28.2	19.5	21.8
Median	35.5	23.6	26.5	28.5	19.2	21.0
S.D.	5.0	6.8	8.3	5.7	6.0	6.6

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF NORTH KOREAN POWs' SCALE SCORES

Score Interval	B Scale			W Scale		
	Officers	EM	Total	Officers	EM	Total
3	—	126	126	—	82	82
4	—	70	70	—	42	42
5	2	101	103	—	101	101
6	3	147	150	2	100	102
7	6	172	178	3	172	175
8	4	182	186	6	130	136
9	22	149	171	24	213	237
10	33	124	157	36	165	201
11	79	84	163	93	122	215
12	65	65	130	69	73	142
13	70	35	105	99	30	129
14	66	21	87	69	34	103
15	135	28	163	84	40	124
Mean	12.7	7.8	9.1	12.4	8.5	9.5
Median	12.9	8.1	9.0	12.6	8.6	9.6
S.D.	2.2	3.0	3.5	1.8	3.1	3.3

SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF CHINESE POWs' SCALE SCORES

Score Interval	OAB Scale			CAB Scale		
	Officers	EM	Total	Officers	EM	Total
8-9	—	2	2	2	—	2
10-11	—	2	2	—	2	2
12-13	—	6	6	—	4	4
14-15	1	8	9	1	1	2
16-17	2	43	45	—	8	8
18-19	19	63	82	1	26	27
20-21	29	104	133	5	42	47
22-23	52	144	196	8	61	69
24-25	53	155	208	9	83	92
26-27	27	126	153	13	112	125
28-29	20	104	124	19	132	151
30-31	9	54	63	31	130	161
32-33	3	16	19	54	108	162
34-35	2	12	14	26	68	94
36-37	—	—	—	25	35	60
38-39	—	—	—	17	17	34
40-41	—	—	—	6	10	16
Mean	23.9	24.1	24.1	31.5	28.3	29.0
Median	23.7	24.1	24.0	32.2	28.7	29.5
S.D.	3.4	4.4	4.4	5.2	5.1	5.3

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF CHINESE POWs' SCALE SCORES

Score Interval	E Scale			I Scale		
	Officers	EM	Total	Officers	EM	Total
4	—	6	6	—	3	3
5	—	1	1	—	2	2
6	1	19	20	2	27	29
7	—	4	4	—	9	9
8	—	40	40	1	53	54
9	2	25	27	4	48	52
10	7	78	85	6	84	90
11	9	62	71	4	90	94
12	23	174	197	14	188	202
13	18	89	107	21	78	99
14	37	107	144	31	106	137
15	34	64	98	43	42	85
16	31	87	118	32	57	89
17	21	29	50	19	19	38
18	19	28	47	14	22	36
19	7	5	12	14	4	18
20	8	21	29	12	7	19
Mean	14.8	12.9	13.3	15.1	12.1	12.7
Median	14.8	12.6	13.2	15.1	12.1	12.5
S.D.	2.5	3.0	3.0	2.7	2.9	3.1

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PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF POWs' SCALE SCORES

North Korean						
Scale	Sample	Low	Moderately Low	Indifference (midpoint)	Moderately High	High
OAB	Off.	00	1	14	27	54
	EM	25	24	15	9	6
	Total	18	18	16	14	19
CAB	Off.	2	10	14	26	32
	EM	30	32	20	5	2
	Total	23	26	18	11	10
B	Off.	1	2	3	20	67
	EM	24	28	15	10	11
	Total	18	21	12	13	26
W	Off.	0	1	3	24	64
	EM	23	18	15	14	13
	Total	17	13	12	17	27
Chinese						
OAB	Off.	00	4	16	31	17
	EM	2	8	14	23	24
	Total	2	7	14	25	22
CAB	Off.	1	2	6	8	61
	EM	1	7	12	20	31
	Total	1	6	11	17	37
E	Off.	1	4	10	15	38
	EM	8	12	19	22	19
	Total	7	10	17	21	23
I	Off.	1	4	6	14	41
	EM	11	15	23	17	12
	Total	9	13	20	20	18

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APPENDIX I

MEAN SCALE SCORES AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
IN RELATION TO BACKGROUND VARIABLES

SECURITY **CONFIDENTIAL** INFORMATION

SECURITY **CONFIDENTIAL** INFORMATIONMEAN SCALING OF IS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
IN RELATION TO BACKGROUND VARIABLES

OAR - OAR - NORTH KOREAN										
	N	Total		Officers		EM		N	M & S.D.	
		M	S.D.	N	M & S.D.	N	M & S.D.			
AGE										
15-19	1	26.3	8.3	81	37.2	5.2	353	24.2	7.1	
20-24	133	27.9	5.7	244	35.6	4.9	402	26.4	6.1	
25-30	110	27.6	8.3	167	35.2	5.1	279	23.2	6.5	
31-40	117	24.3	6.8	35	33.3	5.0	180	22.6	5.8	
Over 40	1	29.6	5.0	14	33.4	3.3	77	24.1	5.2	
RANK										
Enlisted men								1281	23.5	6.6
Ad. Lieutenant	11	36.8	6.2							
Other Officers				115	34.6	4.6				
TOTAL TIME IN ARMY										
months										
0-1	109	29.7	7.7	203	35.4	5.4	1079	23.9	6.8	
2-5	112	27.9	9.1	52	35.7	5.4	90	22.3	2.5	
6-10	93	29.1	9.8	106	36.5	5.4	99	21.2	6.9	
Over 10	111	31.1	6.4	100	34.7	4.8	5			
LENGTH OF TRAINING										
months										
0-3	1370	25.3	8.0	219	35.4	2.7	1110	23.3	6.8	
4-6	102	30.1	8.7	55	36.1	4.7	47	23.1	6.7	
7-9	15	32.0	7.1	29	35.0	4.5	16	26.6		
10-12	11	34.4	6.9	32	36.2	5.2	9	28.0		
Over 12	33	35.8	5.4	80	36.1	5.0	3			
TIME IN COMBAT										
months										
None	1081	27.0	6.1	171	34.3	5.9	910	25.6	8.0	
1-2	418	26.7	8.8	136	35.5	4.7	282	22.5	7.3	
3-4	77	31.6	8.9	51	36.2	4.6	25	22.0	8.1	
Over 4	39	33.3	6.0	28	37.3	5.5	11	23.2		
EDUCATION										
years										
None	354	23.7	6.2	16	33.6		338	23.3	6.2	
1-3	289	24.5	9.1	32	34.1	4.0	257	23.4	6.6	
4-6	641	27.8	8.5	216	35.6	5.3	425	23.8	6.9	
7-9	228	26.9	8.9	63	35.5	4.9	165	23.6	7.7	
10-12	142	30.0	8.9	72	36.2	4.9	70	23.7	7.9	
Over 12	86	33.2	8.2	70	35.7	5.6	16	22.1		

SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

	Total			Officers			EM		
	N	M & S.D.		N	M & S.D.		N	M & S.D.	
CIVILIAN OCCUPATION									
Farmer	1034	25.4	7.9	168	35.5	4.0	866	23.4	6.7
Worker	353	29.2	9.2	157	35.6	5.3	196	24.3	6.9
Student	275	29.1	8.4	103	36.3	4.7	172	24.8	7.2
BRANCH OF MILITARY SERVICE									
Infantry	1239	26.1	8.3	266	35.7	5.1	973	23.4	6.8
Artillery	236	27.4	8.9	74	36.0	5.0	162	23.5	7.2
Quartermaster	55	33.7	8.1	44	35.5	5.2	11	21.6	
Communications	65	24.7	7.4	20	35.8	3.5	45	25.5	6.0
Transport	58	29.4	7.8	26	36.1	4.6	32	24.0	5.5
PARTY MEMBERSHIP									
Labor Party	82	33.0	6.3	62	35.4	4.1	20	25.5	
Democratic Party							58	21.6	1.7
Democratic Youth League	758	25.9	7.8	95	35.5	5.3	663	24.5	7.7
CAB SCALE - NORTH KOREAN									
AGE (years)									
15-20	384	20.9	6.2	31	29.1	5.6	353	20.1	5.4
21-25	643	22.9	6.9	241	28.4	5.6	402	19.6	5.1
26-30	436	22.2	6.7	157	27.8	5.8	279	19.1	8.6
31-35	245	20.3	6.0	35	28.2	5.8	180	18.8	4.9
Over 35	91	20.2	5.2	14	25.7	5.1	77	19.2	4.5
RANK									
Enlisted men							1281	19.4	4.9
Jr. Lieutenant	361	28.5	5.8						
Other Officers				145	27.2	5.3			
TOTAL TIME IN ARMY (months)									
0-4	1282	21.0	6.3	203	28.3	5.8	1079	19.6	5.3
5-8	142	22.6	7.5	52	28.9	6.2	90	18.9	5.1
9-20	205	23.7	7.3	106	28.4	5.8	110	18.6	4.4
Over 20	111	27.1	5.9	100	27.4	4.8	6		
LENGTH OF TRAINING (months)									
0-3	1329	20.8	6.0	1110	19.5	5.5	919	21.5	5.9
4-6	102	24.2	7.2	45	28.5	9.4	17	19.9	6.4
7-9	45	24.7	6.1	29	27.1	6.1	16	20.1	
10-12	41	26.6	5.7	39	27.6	6.9	9	21.1	
Over 12	83	28.1	6.1	50	28.5	6.9			

SECURITY **CONFIDENTIAL** INFORMATION

	Total			Officers			EM		
	N	M & S.D.	N	M & S.D.	N	M & S.D.	N	M & S.D.	
TIME IN COMBAT (months)									
None	1081	21.0	6.1	171	28.3	5.9	910	19.6	8.9
1-2	418	21.9	7.2	136	28.0	6.5	282	19.0	5.6
3-4	77	24.3	6.9	52	27.2	5.3	25	18.2	5.8
Over 4	39	25.7	7.6	28	28.5	6.5	11	18.6	
EDUCATION (years)									
None	354	19.7	5.2	16	25.7		338	19.4	4.8
1-3	289	20.1	5.7	32	28.1	5.7	257	19.1	4.8
4-6	641	22.5	7.0	216	28.5	5.6	425	19.4	5.2
7-9	228	22.5	6.6	63	28.6	6.1	165	20.2	5.3
10-12	142	24.0	7.6	72	28.2	6.0	70	19.6	6.1
Over 12	86	25.5	6.9	70	27.2	6.4	16	18.2	
CIVILIAN OCCUPATION									
Farmer	1084	20.9	6.1	168	28.5	5.6	866	19.4	4.9
Worker	353	23.5	6.1	157	28.2	5.9	196	19.8	5.3
Student	275	23.2	7.1	103	28.5	5.8	172	20.0	5.6
BRANCH OF MILITARY SERVICE									
Infantry	1239	21.3	6.5	266	28.3	5.9	973	19.4	5.3
Artillery	236	22.7	7.1	74	28.7	6.5	162	20.0	5.5
Quartermaster	55	26.6	6.6	44	28.4	5.0	11	19.4	
Communications	65	23.1	6.7	20	29.2	5.0	45	20.3	6.7
Transport	58	22.8	7.1	26	28.0	5.9	32	18.5	4.4
PARTY MEMBERSHIP									
Labor Party	82	25.5	7.1	62	27.9	5.4	20	17.9	
Democratic Party							58	18.9	3.8
Democratic Youth League	758	20.8	5.9	95	27.3	6.6	663	19.9	5.3
B SCALE - NORTH KOREAN									
AGE (years)									
15-20	384	8.4	3.4	31	13.1	1.9	353	8.0	3.3
21-25	643	9.7	4.0	241	12.8	2.3	402	7.8	3.0
26-30	436	9.5	3.4	157	12.6	2.1	279	7.8	2.9
21-35	215	8.1	3.0	35	11.9	1.8	180	7.3	2.4
Over 35	91	8.5	2.3	14	12.3	1.7	77	7.9	2.2
RANK									
Enlisted men							1281	7.8	3.0
Jr. Lieutenant	361	12.7	2.1						
Other Officers				115	12.5	2.2			

SECURITY **CONFIDENTIAL** INFORMATION

	Total			Officers			EM		
	N	M	& S.D.	N	M	& S.D.	N	M	& S.D.
TOTAL TIME IN ARMY									
(months)									
0-4	1282	8.7	3.4	203	12.9	2.3	1079	7.9	3.0
5-8	142	9.4	3.7	52	12.6	2.2	90	7.6	3.4
9-20	205	10.0	3.9	106	12.9	1.9	99	6.9	3.2
Over 20	111	12.1	2.1	106	12.2	2.2	5		
LENGTH OF TRAINING									
(months)									
0-3	1329	8.5	3.3	219	12.7	2.1	1110	7.7	3.0
4-6	102	10.6	3.4	55	13.0	1.9	47	7.9	2.9
7-9	45	11.1	2.9	29	12.3	2.1	16	8.9	
10-12	41	12.5	2.4	32	12.9	1.8	9	11.6	
Over 12	83	12.5	2.1	80	12.6	2.1	3		
TIME IN COMBAT									
(months)									
None	1081	8.6	1.1	171	12.8	2.3	910	7.8	2.8
1-2	418	9.4	3.7	136	12.9	1.9	282	7.7	3.2
3-4	77	10.8	3.5	52	12.3	2.0	25	7.6	3.6
Over 4	39	11.1	3.5	28	12.4	2.2	11	7.6	
EDUCATION									
(years)									
None	354	8.1	2.4	16	11.7		338	8.0	2.6
1-3	289	8.4	2.9	32	12.1	2.4	257	7.9	2.5
4-6	641	9.3	3.5	216	12.6	1.9	425	7.7	3.1
7-9	228	8.9	4.2	63	13.0	2.1	165	7.3	3.5
10-12	142	10.4	3.8	72	12.9	2.2	70	7.9	3.7
Over 12	86	11.9	3.3	70	13.0	2.2	16	7.2	
CIVILIAN OCCUPATION									
Farmer	1034	8.5	3.1	168	12.5	2.1	866	7.7	2.7
Worker	353	10.2	3.5	157	12.6	1.9	196	8.2	3.0
Student	275	10.0	3.8	103	13.1	1.9	172	8.2	3.5
BRANCH OF MILITARY SERVICE									
Infantry	1239	8.9	3.4	266	12.7	2.1	973	7.8	2.9
Artillery	236	9.3	3.8	74	12.8	2.3	162	7.6	3.1
Quartermaster	55	11.5	2.9	44	12.4	2.1	11	7.9	
Communications	65	9.7	3.7	20	13.2	2.3	45	8.2	3.3
Transport	58	9.8	3.0	26	12.5	1.6	32	7.7	2.4
PARTY MEMBERSHIP									
Labor Party	82	11.7	3.0	62	13.0	2.2	20	8.1	
Democratic Party							58	6.6	2.4
Democratic Youth League	758	8.7	3.3	95	12.8	2.2	663	8.2	3.3

SECURITY **CONFIDENTIAL** INFORMATION

	Total			Officers			EM		
	N	M	& S.D.	N	M	& S.D.	N	M	& S.D.
W SCALE - NORTH KOREAN									
AGE (years)									
15-20	384	8.7	3.1	31	12.8	1.2	353	8.4	3.4
21-25	643	10.0	3.4	241	12.4	1.8	402	8.5	3.0
26-30	436	9.9	3.1	157	12.5	1.9	279	8.6	3.2
31-35	215	8.8	2.8	35	12.1	2.0	180	8.2	2.6
Over 35	91	9.3	2.2	14	11.6	1.7	77	8.9	2.1
RANK									
Enlisted men							1281	8.4	2.8
Jr. Lieutenant	361	12.5	1.9						
Other Officers				115	12.2	2.9			
TOTAL TIME IN ARMY (months)									
0-4	1282	9.1	3.0	203	12.5	2.0	1079	8.5	2.9
5-8	142	9.8	3.2	52	12.3	1.7	90	8.4	3.1
9-20	205	10.2	3.5	106	12.6	2.1	99	7.6	2.8
Over 20	111	12.3	2.1	106	12.3	1.8	5		
LENGTH OF TRAINING (months)									
0-3	1329	9.0	3.2	219	12.3	1.8	1110	8.3	4.9
4-6	102	10.6	2.9	55	12.2	1.7	47	8.7	2.8
7-9	45	11.6	2.6	29	12.6	1.8	16	9.9	
10-12	41	12.0	2.1	32	12.5	1.8	9	10.2	
Over 12	83	12.7	2.1	80	12.7	2.4	3		
TIME IN COMBAT (months)									
None	1081	9.1	3.2	171	12.5	1.9	910	8.4	2.8
1-2	418	9.7	3.2	136	12.5	1.9	282	8.4	2.9
3-4	77	11.3	3.0	52	12.5	1.9	25	8.7	3.1
Over 4	39	11.5	2.7	28	12.6	1.6	11	8.6	
EDUCATION (years)									
None	354	8.7	2.5	16	11.9	1.7	338	8.6	2.6
1-3	289	8.9	3.3	32	12.4	2.2	257	8.4	2.9
4-6	641	9.7	3.2	216	12.3	1.8	425	8.4	3.0
7-9	228	9.4	3.6	63	12.6	1.9	165	8.1	3.1
10-12	142	10.5	3.0	72	12.4	1.6	70	8.6	3.1
Over 12	86	11.8	2.8	70	12.6	1.7	16	8.3	
CIVILIAN OCCUPATION									
Farmer	1034	9.0	3.3	168	12.2	2.0	866	8.4	2.8
Worker	353	10.4	3.0	157	12.6	1.9	196	8.7	2.8
Student	275	10.2	3.1	103	12.7	1.5	172	8.8	3.0

SECURITY **CONFIDENTIAL** INFORMATION

	Total			Officers			EM		
	N	M & S.D.	N	M & S.D.	N	M & S.D.	N	M & S.D.	
BRANCH OF MILITARY SERVICE									
Infantry	1239	9.3	3.2	266	12.4	1.8	973	8.4	2.9
Artillery	236	9.6	3.4	74	12.6	2.1	162	8.2	3.1
Quartermaster	55	11.4	2.7	44	12.1	1.6	11	8.4	
Communications	65	10.3	3.5	20	13.3	1.7	45	8.0	3.1
Transport	58	10.4	2.8	26	12.3	2.2	32	8.9	2.4
PARTY MEMBERSHIP									
Labor Party	82	11.8	2.5	62	12.5	1.9	20	9.5	
Democratic Party							58	7.3	2.1
Democratic Youth League	758	9.3	3.3	95	12.5	2.0	663	8.8	3.0
OAB SCALE - CHINESE									
AGE (years)									
15-20	133	24.0	4.5	12	23.6	2.0	121	24.0	4.6
21-25	415	24.1	4.1	98	23.8	3.5	317	24.2	4.3
26-30	308	24.2	4.2	69	24.1	3.9	239	24.2	4.3
31-35	140	24.3	4.1	22	24.1	3.2	118	24.4	4.2
Over 35	50	23.1	4.2	16	23.7	2.1	34	22.9	4.9
RANK									
Private							691	23.9	4.4
Unit Leader							36	24.0	4.0
Sub-squad Leader							35	25.0	4.3
Squad Leader							57	26.0	4.0
Sub-platoon Leader				56	24.6	3.6			
Platoon Leader				116	24.1	3.2			
Company, Battalion Leader				36	22.3	3.5			
TIME IN ARMY (months)									
0-4	138	23.1	4.0	15	23.7	4.2	123	23.1	4.0
5-8	284	24.5	4.1	18	23.4	2.9	266	24.5	4.2
9-20	169	24.0	4.1	38	24.6	3.6	131	23.0	4.2
Over 20	442	24.2	4.3	144	23.8	3.4	298	24.4	4.6
LENGTH OF TRAINING (months)									
0-3	561	23.8	4.2	54	23.5	3.5	507	23.8	4.2
4-6	155	24.6	3.8	47	24.5	2.4	108	24.6	4.2
7-9	54	23.4	3.7	16	22.6	2.7	38	23.8	4.0
10-12	34	24.1	3.5	16	23.1	3.1	18	24.9	3.6
Over 12	156	24.6	4.7	68	24.3	3.8	88	24.9	5.3
TIME IN COMBAT (months)									
None	210	24.6	4.7	7	24.3	3.2	203	24.6	4.7
1-2	587	23.9	4.1	114	23.5	3.2	473	23.9	4.2
3-4	97	24.0	3.4	39	24.4	2.9	58	23.7	3.7
5-10	136	24.1	4.4	54	24.0	4.0	82	24.2	4.7

SECURITY **CONFIDENTIAL** INFORMATION

	Total			Officers			EM		
	N	M & S.D.		N	M & S.D.		N	M & S.D.	
EDUCATION									
(years)									
None							429	23.8	4.2
1-3	297	24.5	4.2	26	24.0	2.0	271	24.5	4.3
4-6	141	24.3	4.2	55	23.4	3.4	86	24.9	4.6
7-9	83	24.0	4.1	53	23.5	3.4	30	24.8	5.0
10-12				56	24.8	3.9			
Over 12				23	23.7	3.4			
CIVILIAN OCCUPATION									
Farmer	603	24.2	4.2	29	23.6	3.1	574	24.2	4.2
Worker	146	23.8	4.6	5			141	23.9	4.6
Student	180	24.0	3.9	130	24.0	3.5	50	24.0	4.7
Prop. & Businessmen	66	24.0	3.6	32	23.5	3.3	34	24.3	3.7
BRANCH OF MILITARY SERVICE									
Infantry	712	24.2	4.3	101	24.2	3.6	611	24.2	4.4
Artillery	161	23.8	4.5	27	23.8	4.0	134	23.8	4.6
Transportation	30	23.8	3.5	9	23.2	2.8	21	24.1	3.8
Signal Corps	54	24.2	4.0	14	23.8	3.0	40	24.4	4.3
Quartermaster	17	23.3	3.2	14	23.1	3.5	3		
Polit Prop	31	23.9	3.0	27	23.9	2.8	4		
PARTY MEMBERSHIP									
Communist Party	50	22.7	3.1	41	22.5	2.9	9	23.6	3.8
New Democratic Youth League	31	25.6	4.1	14	23.4	2.1	17	27.4	4.5
Kuomintang	115	24.9	3.6	87	24.9	3.4	28	24.8	4.0
CAB SCALE - CHINESE									
AGE									
(years)									
15-20	133	27.8	5.4	12	28.8	3.7	121	27.7	5.5
21-25	415	29.1	5.5	98	32.2	5.5	317	28.1	5.2
26-30	308	29.2	5.1	69	31.1	5.2	239	28.7	4.9
31-35	140	29.0	4.9	22	30.3	4.3	118	28.7	5.0
Over 35	50	29.8	4.4	16	32.8	3.8	34	28.4	4.7
RANK									
Private							691	28.1	5.1
Unit Leader							36	29.0	3.6
Sub-squad Leader							35	30.1	6.0
Squad Leader							57	30.0	4.8
Sub-platoon Leader				56	32.2	3.8			
Platoon Leader				116	31.9	5.1			
Company, Battalion Leader				36	29.6	6.7			
TIME IN ARMY									
(months)									
0-4	138	27.5	4.8	15	34.0	3.6	123	26.7	4.5
5-8	284	28.8	5.0	18	33.2	3.8	266	28.6	5.0
9-20	169	29.2	5.0	38	33.2	3.9	131	28.1	5.2
Over 20	442	29.4	5.4	144	30.7	5.5	298	28.8	5.3

SECURITY **CONFIDENTIAL** INFORMATION

	Total			Officers			EM		
	N	M & S.D.	N	M & S.D.	N	M & S.D.	N	M & S.D.	
LENGTH OF TRAINING (months)									
0-3	561	28.2 4.9	54	31.8 4.9	507	27.9 5.0			
4-6	155	29.8 2.3	47	31.1 3.9	108	29.3 5.2			
7-9	54	27.3 5.3	16	29.0 5.7	38	26.6 4.9			
10-12	34	30.3 5.9	16	30.4 7.1	18	30.3 4.6			
Over 12	156	31.1 4.0	68	32.5 5.4	88	29.9 5.0			
TIME IN COMBAT (months)									
None	210	29.2 5.2	7	29.9 9.4	203	29.1 5.0			
1-2	587	28.7 5.0	114	32.2 5.0	473	27.9 5.2			
3-4	97	29.3 4.2	39	31.8 3.9	58	27.6 4.7			
5-10	186	29.6 5.0	54	30.2 5.2	82	29.2 4.7			
EDUCATION (years)									
None					429	28.1 4.9			
1-3	297	28.4 5.2	26	30.1 4.0	271	28.2 5.2			
4-6	141	29.6 5.0	55	30.0 4.7	86	29.4 5.2			
7-9	83	31.1 3.3	53	31.6 4.8	30	30.3 5.3			
10-12			56	33.5 5.4					
Over 12			28	33.5 3.3					
CIVILIAN OCCUPATION									
Farmer	603	28.2 4.9	29	29.2 4.2	574	28.1 4.9			
Worker	146	28.8 5.5	5		141	28.8 5.5			
Student	180	31.3 3.4	130	32.3 5.6	50	28.7 5.7			
Prop. & Businessmen	66	29.7 3.7	32	31.0 4.3	34	28.6 4.9			
BRANCH OF MILITARY SERVICE									
Infantry	712	28.6 5.1	101	31.1 5.5	611	28.2 4.9			
Artillery	161	28.8 5.4	27	32.5 4.6	134	28.0 5.6			
Transportation	30	29.7 2.0	9	32.6 5.2	21	28.4 5.9			
Signal Corps	54	30.7 4.6	14	30.8 4.2	40	30.6 4.7			
Quartermaster	17	31.4 4.3	14	32.7 3.4	3				
Polit Prop	31	31.0 5.6	27	31.1 5.8	4				
PARTY MEMBERSHIP									
Communist Party	50	28.5 5.2	41	28.8 5.2	9	27.1 5.0			
New Democratic Youth League	31	31.5 3.2	14	30.6 4.6	17	32.2 5.1			
Kuomintang	115	31.7 3.0	87	32.6 5.6	28	28.8 4.9			
E SCALE-CHINESE									
AGE (years)									
15-20	133	13.2 3.0	12	14.8 1.7	121	13.0 3.0			
21-25	415	13.2 3.1	98	15.1 2.7	317	19.6 3.0			
26-30	308	13.6 3.1	69	15.0 2.4	239	13.1 3.1			
31-35	140	13.3 2.8	22	14.2 2.1	118	13.1 2.9			
Over 35	50	12.6 2.8	16	13.6 2.3	34	12.2 2.8			

SECURITY **CONFIDENTIAL** INFORMATION

	Total			Officers			EM		
	N	M	& S.D.	N	M	& S.D.	N	M	& S.D.
RANK									
Private							691	12.7	3.0
Unit Leader							36	13.1	2.7
Sub-squad Leader							35	13.5	3.3
Squad Leader							57	13.5	3.3
Sub-platoon Ldr	56	15.3	2.1						
Platoon Ldr	116	14.8	2.6						
Company, Battalion Leader	36	14.4	2.7						
TIME IN ARMY (months)									
0-4	138	12.6	2.7	15	15.7	2.7	123	12.3	2.5
5-8	284	12.9	3.0	18	14.4	2.5	266	12.8	3.0
9-20	169	13.4	3.1	38	15.2	2.2	131	12.9	3.1
Over 20	442	13.7	3.1	144	14.7	2.6	298	13.2	3.2
LENGTH OF TRAINING (months)									
0-3	561	12.8	3.0	54	14.5	2.1	507	12.6	3.0
4-6	155	13.5	3.1	47	14.3	2.7	108	13.1	3.2
7-9	54	13.3	3.1	16	14.1	2.9	38	13.0	3.2
10-12	34	14.3	2.6	16	14.7	1.6	18	14.0	3.3
Over 12	156	14.5	2.9	68	15.5	2.6	88	13.7	2.8
TIME IN COMBAT (months)									
None	210	12.9	3.1	7	14.9	2.9	202	12.9	3.1
1-2	587	13.3	2.9	114	15.0	2.4	473	12.9	2.9
3-4	97	13.4	3.0	39	14.4	2.5	58	12.8	3.2
5-10	136	13.7	3.3	54	14.6	2.6	82	13.1	3.6
EDUCATION (years)									
None							429	12.5	3.1
1-3	297	13.1	2.8	26	13.3	2.5	271	13.1	2.9
4-6	141	13.9	2.9	55	14.8	2.6	86	13.3	2.9
7-9	83	14.6	2.7	53	15.0	2.1	30	13.9	3.4
10-12				56	15.3	2.6			
Over 12				23	15.2	2.4			
CIVILIAN OCCUPATION									
Farmer	603	12.8	3.0	29	13.6	2.6	574	12.8	3.0
Worker	146	12.8	3.2	5			141	12.7	3.3
Student	180	14.6	2.9	130	15.2	2.6	50	13.3	3.1
Prop & Businessman	66	13.8	2.8	32	14.7	2.5	34	13.0	2.8
BRANCH OF MILITARY SERVICE									
Infantry	712	13.1	3.0	101	14.6	2.5	611	12.8	3.0
Artillery	161	13.4	3.3	27	15.7	2.6	184	12.9	3.2
Transportation	30	13.1	3.7	9	15.0	3.2	21	12.3	3.6
Signal Corps	54	13.7	2.6	14	14.0	1.7	40	13.5	2.9
Quartermaster	17	14.5	2.8	14	14.9	2.8	3		
Polit Prop	31	14.6	2.5	27	15.0	2.0	4		

SECURITY **CONFIDENTIAL** INFORMATION

	Total			Officers			EM		
	N	M	S.D.	N	M	S.D.	N	M	S.D.
PARTY MEMBERSHIP									
Communist Party	50	13.8	2.3	41	14.1	2.0	9	12.6	3.1
New Democratic Youth League	31	13.7	3.2	14	14.7	2.2	17	12.9	3.7
Kuomintang	113	14.7	3.1	87	15.2	2.9	28	13.1	3.1
I SCALE - CHINESE									
AGE (years)									
15-20	133	12.2	1.2	12	15.6	1.8	121	11.9	3.0
21-25	415	12.9	3.2	98	15.4	2.6	317	12.2	2.9
26-30	308	12.8	3.2	69	15.1	3.0	239	12.1	2.9
31-35	140	12.7	2.5	22	14.2	2.3	118	12.5	2.4
Over 35	50	12.6	3.0	16	14.3	2.6	34	11.8	2.8
RANK									
Private							691	12.0	2.9
Unit Leader							36	12.8	2.8
Sub-squad Leader							35	12.8	2.8
Squad Leader							57	12.5	2.7
Sub-platoon Leader				56	15.3	2.7			
Platoon Leader				116	15.1	2.4			
Company Battalion Leader				36	15.1	3.3			
TIME IN ARMY (months)									
0-4	138	12.4	2.7	15	15.5	2.4	123	12.0	2.4
5-8	284	12.0	3.2	18	15.7	2.8	266	11.8	3.0
9-20	169	13.1	3.0	38	15.3	2.4	131	12.5	2.9
Over 20	442	13.2	3.1	144	14.9	2.8	298	12.3	2.9
LENGTH OF TRAINING (months)									
0-3	561	12.5	2.9	54	15.3	2.2	507	12.2	2.8
4-6	155	12.6	3.2	47	14.3	2.9	108	11.8	3.0
7-9	54	12.9	2.9	16	13.6	3.3	38	12.6	2.7
10-12	34	13.5	3.3	16	15.3	1.9	18	12.0	3.4
Over 12	156	13.5	3.2	68	15.9	2.3	88	11.7	2.7
TIME IN COMBAT (months)									
None	210	12.3	2.7	7	15.6	2.1	208	12.2	2.7
1-2	587	12.7	3.2	114	15.2	2.4	473	12.0	3.0
3-4	97	13.2	3.1	39	14.9	2.9	58	12.1	2.7
5-10	136	13.3	3.2	54	15.1	2.9	82	12.1	2.8

SECURITY **CONFIDENTIAL** INFORMATION

	Total			Officers			EM		
	N	M & S.D.		N	M & S.D.		N	M & S.D.	
EDUCATION (years)									
None							429	11.9	2.8
1-3	297	12.0	2.8	26	12.9	2.8	271	11.9	2.7
4-6	141	13.3	2.9	55	14.5	2.6	86	12.6	2.9
7-9	83	15.0	2.8	53	15.3	1.8	30	13.6	3.7
10-12				56	15.8	2.9			
Over 12				23	15.6	2.2			
CIVILIAN OCCUPATION									
Farmer	603	12.1	2.8	29	13.2	3.1	574	12.0	2.8
Worker	146	12.3	2.8	5			141	12.2	2.8
Student	180	14.9	3.2	130	15.9	2.4	50	12.5	3.6
Prop & Businessman	66	13.5	2.9	32	14.4	2.3	34	12.6	3.2
BRANCH OF MILITARY SERVICE									
Infantry	712	12.5	2.9	101	14.7	2.7	611	12.1	2.8
Artillery	161	12.8	3.4	27	15.8	3.2	134	12.2	3.1
Transportation	30	13.3	2.9	9	13.8	2.3	21	13.1	3.1
Signal Corps	54	12.4	2.7	14	14.2	1.3	40	11.8	2.8
Quartermaster	17	14.7	3.1	14	15.4	2.4	3		
Polit Prop	31	15.5	2.5	27	15.8	2.3	4		
PARTY MEMBERSHIP									
Communist Party	50	14.2	2.5	41	14.2	2.3	9	13.8	3.4
New Democratic Youth League	31	13.5	3.3	14	15.2	3.0	17	12.0	2.7
Kuomintang	115	14.8	3.2	87	15.6	2.8	28	12.2	2.9

SECURITY **CONFIDENTIAL** INFORMATION

APPENDIX J

DEGREE OF RESISTANCE
TO CAPTURE-SURRENDER SCALE

SECURITY **CONFIDENTIAL** INFORMATION

DEGREE OF RESISTANCE
TO CAPTURE-SURRENDER SCALE

1. "I did everything I could to give myself up to the enemy."
(Agree; Disagree)
2. "I made up my mind long ago to surrender at the first opportunity."
(Agree; Disagree)
3. "When I was confronted by the enemy I made no effort to resist becoming a POW."
(Agree; Disagree)
4. "When I was taken prisoner I was too badly wounded or too sick to resist the enemy."
(Agree; Disagree)
5. "I was taken prisoner by the United Nations forces against my own free will."
6. "I was taken prisoner only after resisting the enemy to the best of my ability."
7. "I resisted the enemy with all the weapons at my command and did not give myself up until I saw I would be killed if I fought."
(Agree; Disagree)

SECURITY **CONFIDENTIAL** INFORMATION

APPENDIX K

CAPTUREES AND SURRENDERERS
MEAN SCALE SCORES AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS

SECURITY **CONFIDENTIAL** INFORMATION

SECURITY **CONFIDENTIAL** INFORMATIONNORTH KOREAN CAPTUREES AND SURRENDERERS MEAN
SCALE SCORES AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS

	N	OAB SCALE		CAB SCALE		B SCALE		W SCALE	
		M	S.D.	M	S.D.	M	S.D.	M	S.D.
Total									
Capturees	624	33.5	6.0	26.0	6.4	11.9	2.5	11.9	2.2
Surrenderers	857	22.0	6.0	18.7	4.9	7.1	2.7	7.8	2.7
Officers									
Capturees	353	36.2	4.8	28.6	5.9	12.0	2.0	12.6	1.9
Surrenderers	35	31.6	5.2	25.6	6.2	11.2	2.2	11.8	1.7
EM									
Capturees	271	30.0	5.6	22.5	5.2	10.6	2.4	10.9	2.3
Surrenderers	822	21.6	5.6	18.4	4.6	6.9	2.6	7.7	2.6

CHINESE CAPTUREES AND SURRENDERERS MEAN
SCALE SCORES AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS

	N	OAB SCALE		CAB SCALE		E SCALE		I SCALE	
		M	S.D.	M	S.D.	M	S.D.	M	S.D.
Total									
Capturees	264	22.3	3.7	26.4	4.8	12.2	2.7	12.3	2.9
Surrenderers	724	24.9	4.1	29.9	5.1	13.6	3.1	13.9	3.1
Officers									
Capturees	40	22.3	2.7	28.9	4.6	13.9	2.1	14.1	2.8
Surrenderers	163	24.5	3.5	32.3	5.1	15.2	2.5	15.3	2.7
EM									
Capturees	224	22.3	3.7	26.0	4.7	11.9	2.7	12.1	2.8
Surrenderers	561	25.0	4.2	29.3	4.9	13.2	3.1	12.4	2.9